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Payment Methods Accepted. Field Artillery. Customers who bought this product also purchased FM Information Collection. ATP ATTP At its core, F3EAD is a formula used to identify and solve problems. If you understand the problem, or at least have as much information as possible, this formula can be used as an instrument of counter-terrorism for any agency or department. The way the military, Army or more specifically ARSOF consolidate and organize information about a particular problem is in the 1st paragraph, or "Situation" paragraph of an Operations Order.

While this format is the most basic and almost parochial way or organizing information in a joint endeavor to solve an identified problem, its simplicity lends itself not only to dynamic problem solving, it allows those from multiple services, agencies departments, countries etc to communicate and participate using a common language. Identifying a simple format for everyone to use reduces superfluous learning and allows all involved to focus more directly on the task at hand.

It cannot be applied in a vacuum and an intimate knowledge of statutes, jurisdictions, foreign and domestic law and its use's impact on US policy should be the focus of some discussion before choosing the cycle as a part of any course of action. Are there lessons from this framework that can be applied to CT efforts on the homeland and in international zones where terrorism is being planned? Apologies if this is a stupid question, but Im interested in the differences, subtle or otherwise, between SOF mission and operation planning in a military context compared with counter terrorism planning in a non-military arena.

What's broken is that we don't do MDMP at all anymore. We use overcomplicated "CONOP" formats as incomprehensible gibberish to conceal the absence of honest thought. Powerpoint is meant as a presentation tool, not a planning and production tool. More can be accomplished by laminated large sheets of paper, pasting them to the wall and rooting out specified and implied etc.

The second problem is simple: if a Battle Staff is discussing the definition of targeting after deploying, there is an error in sequencing. Deployments are for the conduct of decisive operations designed to achieve a known end-state. Targeting as it it today is inherently tied to MDMP--but MDMP is broken big timetry to fit the current concept of targeting into the coming staff process being currently discussedDesign. The decide functions draws heavily on a detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield IPB and continuous assessment of the situation HQ DA, D3A is MDMP, during MDMP we may have to execute a target that lends itself to fast decisive action that would have to be engaged outside of the normal planning process and requires dynamic execution.

During deliberate targeting this would be categorized as an on-call target. These targets have actions planned against them but not at a specific time so they would fall outside of the normal ATO process and targeting process. I recognize many of us have seen successful targeting at many echelons and failed targeting at many echelons.

As you consider your recommendations on your experiences I urge that you look at it from a holistic perspective across, and I hate to use this term, the full spectrum of operations. Recognizing the tactical advantage that the SOF offers us as a whole there is more to targeting than this. I will also argue that it would not work well at all echelons. What the author is referring to as a legacy targeting process is the targeting process. It is iterative, repeatable, consistent and flexible enough to be used in any fight COIN or otherwise.

Staff organized and Commander driven, the inconsistency arises because of the lack of staff understanding. This lack of staff understanding is evident in this article. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.

FM does not go into the targeting process at all for SOF. SOF or better yet JSOC marches to a totally different drumbeat of a 24 hr targeting cycle and the core targeting methodology is built around F3EA not as the article reflects F3EAD as they do not need to get into a D mode as they are fused with the shooters all in the same room as intel and operations. KEY element absolutely not talked about in this article is the complex issues around sysnchronization and integration of organic, tactical and operational ISR assets that are a central KEY compotent of targeting.

Good article on a relevant and important adaptation of the tried and true targeting methodologies we have used for many years. It is important that best practices are shared and inculcated in training and programs designed to build the future force. I must concede that casting any potential critics as simpletons before they have a chance to open their mouths is a good debate technique, especially if the debate is televised, but it seems unnecessary and inappropriate here.

The authors actually have some very good points, it was a good and informative article about the merits of F3EAD, they make a solid case about why it might make great sense to better define the targeting process. However, much of what is good is swept away by not properly addressing the underlying issue - that a process is only as good as the people who use it and the way in which they use it.

Most of what the authors point to as improvements that F3EAD might bring are really just backhanded commentaries on the improper use of existing target methodology — the same critiques that would probably apply to F3EAD if it were the targeting law of the land…. If that is not happening to the satisfaction of the authors, is that because of the process or the people involved?

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But more to the point, only one aspect of D3A addresses delivering or finishing anything — the rest is devoted; to the commander deciding what to target, why to target it, and what effects are necessary; where it is and how to deliver the fires necessary to create the desired effects; assessing the effects of those fires in terms of reattack, future targeting, and yes, utilization of the intelligence generated from that assessment effort. Any process, to include F3EAD, is useless if not understood and utilized appropriately and in good faith.

It is not appropriate to maintain the status quo just to maintain the status quo, but nor is it appropriate to make change for the sake of change and declare it progress because change has occurred.

I would argue that the key in determining whether F3EAD should supplant any particular targeting methodology is that, given the same groups of people with the same experiences and training, does F3EAD deliver a better effect? White is acknowledged as an official statement or act of the U.

Tier One Targeting: Special Operations and the F3EAD Process • The Havok Journal

The information should be true and factual. It also includes all output identified as coming from U. The true source U. Government is not revealed to the target audience. The activity engaged in plausibly appears to emanate from a non-official American source, or an indigenous, non-hostile source, or there may be no attribution. Gray is that information whose content is such that the effect will be increased if the hand of the U.

Government and in some cases any American participation are not revealed. It is simply a means for the U. The activity engaged in appears to emanate from a source government, party, group, organization, person usually hostile in nature.

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The interest of the U. It is best used in support of strategic plans. Further, black PSYOP, to be credible, may need to disclose sensitive material, with the damage caused by information disclosure considered to be outweighed by the impact of successful deception. Personnel involved in one must not be engaged in the other. PSYOP conveys messages via visual, audio, and audiovisual media. Military psychological operations, at the tactical level, are usually delivered by loudspeaker, and face to face communication. For more deliberate campaigns, they may use leaflets, radio or television.

Strategic operations may use radio or television broadcasts, various publications, airdropped leaflets, or, as part of a covert operation, with material placed in foreign news media. Before these steps can occur, intelligence analysts must profile potential targets in order to determine which ones it would be most beneficial to target. In order to figure this out, analysts must determine the vulnerabilities of these groups and what they would be susceptible to. The analysts also determine the attitudes of the targets toward the current situation, their complaints, ethnic origin, frustrations, languages, problems, tensions, attitudes, motivations, and perceptions, and so on.

Psychological operations should be planned carefully, in that even a tactical message, with modern news media, can spread worldwide and be treated as the policy of the United States. The U. Army is responsible for military psychological warfare doctrine. The message to be delivered can be adapted to tactical situations, but promises made must be consistent with national policy. PSYOP forces are forbidden to target i. Tactical Psychological Operations teams TPTs were employed to disseminate information by loudspeaker on locations of relief shelters and facilities.

Psychological operations do not accomplish missions alone. They work best when they are combined with and integrated in an overall theater campaign plan. The majority of U. Though, it is worth noting that this does not rule out PSYOP targeting foreign audiences of allied nations.

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Additionally, in the Information Operations Roadmap made public January but originally approved by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in October , it stated "information intended for foreign audiences, including public diplomacy and PSYOP, increasingly is consumed by our domestic audience and vice-versa. Until shortly after the start of the war on terror, the Army's Psychological Operations elements were administratively organized alongside Civil Affairs to form the U.

Army Psychological Operations provide support to operations ranging from strategic planning down to tactical employment.

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A team is equipped with a Humvee fitted with a loud speaker, and often works with a local translator indigenous to the host or occupied country. Generally, each maneuver battalion -sized element in a theater of war or operational area has at least one TPT attached to it. Upon selection for Psychological Operations, Soldiers then enter the Psychological Operations Qualification Course POQC or "Q-Course" consisting of Special Operations Language training, advance cultural and regional studies, MOS specific training, special operations particular training along with a culmination exercise which incorporates and validates the new skillsets attained by the Soldier.

Certain reserve soldiers serving in units designated as Airborne are also required to attend Airborne training, while language training and Airborne qualification for PSYOP soldiers assigned to non-Airborne units is awarded on a merit and need basis. Army field manual released in January states that "Inform and Influence Activities" are critical for describing, directing, and leading military operations.

With the ability of naval vessels especially the larger task forces to produce audio-visual materials the Navy can often produce PSYOP products for use in denied areas. Navy possesses the capability to produce audiovisual products in the Fleet Audiovisual Command, Pacific; the Fleet Imagery Command, Atlantic; the Fleet Combat Camera Groups; Naval Imaging Command; various film libraries; and limited capability from ships and aircraft of the fleet. Navy personnel assets have the capability to produce documents, posters, articles, and other material suitable for PSYOP.

Administrative capabilities exist ashore and afloat that prepare and produce various quantities of printed materials. Language capabilities exist in naval intelligence and among naval personnel for most European and Asian languages. The Fleet Tactical Readiness Group provides equipment and technical maintenance support to conduct civil radio broadcasts and broadcast jamming in the amplitude modulation frequency band.

The unit is capable of being fully operational within 48 hours of receipt of tasking.

The Targeting Process (FM 3-60 / FM 6-20-10)

The unit's equipment consists of a The media broadcast is created by various agencies and organizations. The Commando Solo aircraft currently is the only stand-off, high-altitude means available to PSYOP forces to disseminate information to large denied areas. Straightforward physics dictate the range, given the power installed and the antenna configuration and assuming clear channels. The enhanced altitude capability of the Commando Solo EC—J now funded is increasing transmitter range.

While this is an improvement over E capability, it is a small step, since the increase in altitude is only 7, feet less than 50 percent and the range increase is governed by a square root function that is, a 14 percent increase in range. Department of State during peacetime and the early stages of war:. This program shall include all foreign information activities conducted by departments and agencies of the U. Government, and with related planning The employment and expansion, insofar as is feasible, of the activities and facilities which compose the national foreign information program in time of peace, in order to assure rapid transition to operations in time of national emergency or war.